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Papers in Organizations – Editor’s Foreword 
 
The purpose of the series Papers in Organization is to work as a stepping-stone towards final 
publication in scientific journals. As such, PIO is a working-paper series, yet with a distinct 
position in the process towards final publication. The aim of PIO is to be the final stepping-
stone in that process: 
 
- For the author PIO should add value to the work in progress through the editorial proc-
ess. A publication in PIO is thus also a measure of the quality of the work – it is no 
longer simply a draft or an informal contribution to debates, but a work close to final 
publication. 
 
- For the reader PIO should be a good place to be if one wants to keep track of contem-
porary research within the international field of organization studies. Indeed, many of 
the papers are manuscripts, which have been submitted to social science journals and as 
such appear in a rather final stage of completion. Others may contribute with empirical 
results from ongoing research projects or may in a more theoretical sense contribute to 
current academic disputes. 
 
In this paper, Mie Augier provides a rich description of the intellectual traditions, the signifi-
cant people and academic institutions that in some way or another made a difference to Davis 
Teece’s own intellectual development. In this sense, it is a dynamic account of the emerging 
career of a distinguished scholar - but not only that. It is also a description of the co-
development of three major disciplinary fields; organization theory, economics and strategic 
management during three decades or so. David Teece has made several important contribu-
tions, perhaps most notably to economics (on the theory of the firm and transaction cost eco-
nomics) and strategic management (on dynamic capabilities) while drawing upon organization 
theory and notions such as organizational routines and bounded rationality. In addition, Augier 
also provides an interview with David Teece, a true scholar still unsettled with what has been 
achieved so far - in all three fields: “Maybe I’m wrong; and maybe technology is a special case 
and maybe technology and organization do not belong at the core of the theory of the firm. My 
intuition tells me otherwise.” (David Teece, quoted in this issue). 
 
Kjell Tryggestad/Søren Christensen 
Editors
 Introduction 
David J. Teece (born 1948) received his 
Ph.D. in economics from the University of 
Pennsylvania and was on the faculty at 
Stanford University before going to UC 
Berkeley where he is currently a chaired 
Professor at the Haas School of Business, 
and the director of the Institute of Man-
agement, Innovation and Organization.  
 
Teece has made key contributions to the 
theory of the firm and strategic manage-
ment, the economics of technological 
change, knowledge management, technol-
ogy transfer, antitrust economics and sev-
eral other areas.  His early work focused on 
issues relating to the internal organization 
of business firms and their boundaries and 
diversification, extending and pioneering 
the statistical testing of transaction cost 
economics (TCE) framework originally 
developed by Ronald Coase and Oliver 
Williamson.  He imported to TCE ideas 
from evolutionary economics, and from 
Edith Penrose.  Later work introduced the 
ideas of complementary assets and appro-
priability regimes (1986) in building a con-
ceptual framework for understanding which 
factors influence who profits from innova-
tion (the innovating firm, the follower, or 
firms owning related assets).   
 
Teece is one of the founding fathers of stra-
tegic management as we know it today; he 
pioneered research on both the resource 
based approach and especially dynamic 
capabilities, thereby helping to establish the 
competence based perspective on economic 
organization.  He has also contributed to 
related areas such as technology transfer, 
organization theory, intellectual property 
rights, and general management.  At the 
core of his work (in particularly in the the-
ory of the firm and strategic management 
area) is enhancing, testing, then synthesiz-
ing different intellectual traditions – in par-
ticular transaction cost economics, evolu-
tionary economics and the so-called capa-
bility approach.  His overarching ambition 
is to build a coherent and robust under-
standing of the central issues in economic 
organization and wealth creation, particu-
larly at the level of the firm.  
 
Particularly important to Teece’s work is 
his deep understanding of the dynamics of 
business organization.  Educated in eco-
nomics, Teece draws on economic con-
cepts; but he also uses insights from or-
ganization theory and management in de-
veloping an understanding of the dynamics 
of the modern business enterprise (Teece, 
1984; Teece and Winter, 1984).  In his later 
work, he provides much of the intellectual 
foundation for understanding dynamic cor-
porate strategy, which has relevance for 
economists, strategy scholars, and manag-
ers.  Thus, the evolving dynamics of 
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 Teece’s own ideas and work have signifi-
cantly influenced the evolving dynamics of 
the fields to which he is contributing.  
Therefore, in trying to understand the de-
velopment of his ideas we might also come 
to understand developments in the fields to 
which he has contributed, in particular the 
field of strategic management, a complex 
field grappling with many important issues.  
 
When young scholars today begin to study 
strategic management, they will immedi-
ately observe that the field is in serious dis-
array.  Like other relatively new fields 
(such as organization theory), there has 
been a tendency to encourage fragmenta-
tion and to favor new ideas rather than inte-
gration and consolidation of old ones; thus 
favoring what Thomas Kuhn referred to as  
'revolutionary' instead of 'normal' science.  
This is only superficially appealing, as it 
does not lead to cumulative learning. What 
Jeffery Pfeffer (1993) observed about or-
ganization theory is therefore true for stra-
tegic management too: “there are [in strate-
gic management] thousands of flowers 
blooming but nobody does any manicuring 
or tending” (also see March, 199, 1996).  
We see this manifested in the diverse ap-
proaches ranging from rational choice the-
ory and game theory, to institutional and 
evolutionary theory, to post feminism and 
social constructivism, to name just a few.  
Fragmentation is encouraged.  There exists 
a plethora of academic journals and profes-
sional societies within the field of strategy.  
Awards and best paper prizes are given for 
formulating "new concepts" but not for 
testing and rejecting concepts already in-
vented.  As Teece mentions in the interview 
below, there is too much pluralism for stra-
tegic management to be a ‘research pro-
gram’ in the Kuhnian sense.  Ultimately, 
this lack of integration and strong discipli-
nary foundations leads to a situation where 
the historical dimensions of the field gets 
lost and evolutionary opportunities missed.  
 
James March (1991) developed these 
Kuhnian ideas into an organizational learn-
ing framework, which can be applied to the 
evolution of ideas/research programs: 
 
“[Research programs, such as those pre-
vailing in strategic management] that en-
gage in exploration to the exclusion of ex-
ploitation are likely to find that they suffer 
the cost of experimentation without gaining 
many of its benefits.  They exhibit too many 
undeveloped new ideas and too little dis-
tinctive competence.  Conversely, [research 
programs] that engage in exploitation to 
the exclusion of exploration are likely to 
find themselves trapped in suboptimal sta-
ble equilibria” (March, 1991, p. 71). 
 
One implication of this is that a situation of 
too much exploitation and too little explo-
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 ration can lead (and is already leading) to a 
‘competency trap’ situation where older 
theories will not be replaced by new ones, 
but just forgotten. The creation of an inde-
pendent quasi-discipline of strategic man-
agement has many valuable consequences, 
but it risks separating the field from the 
discipline of disciplines.  This separation 
from the disciplines has implications for the 
balancing of exploration and exploitation 
required for the long run adaptation of the 
field (March, 1991).  It makes the field 
more “open” (exploration) but less effi-
ciently rigorous (exploitation).  And indeed, 
one of the insights from Jim March (1991, 
1996) is that research programs and schol-
ars must engage in researching the past in 
order to maintain a balance between the 
exploration and the exploitation of ideas. 
David Teece’s 1997 paper on Strategic 
Management (first circulated in 1990) did 
exactly that.  In providing a conceptual 
framework for mapping out and then ad-
vancing the different traditions in strategic 
management, he also provided us a frame-
work for understanding the field’s history 
and contributions to it.  
 
Teece’s ideas are considerably more inter-
disciplinary than those of his fellow 
economists.  Many of his contributions 
stand out because they embrace ideas from 
several disciplines; and his research covers 
various aspects and levels of the modern 
organization.  For instance, in his important 
contributions to the theory of corporate 
diversification (1980, 1982), Teece used 
transaction cost economics to understand 
diversification, building a theory of diversi-
fication around the problem of technology 
transfer (Teece, 1980); and trying to extend 
the transaction cost framework of the firm 
by introducing more evolutionary insights 
(1982).  In addition, his paper on ‘Organ-
izational Structure and Economic Perform-
ance” (Armour and Teece, 1978), was (re-
markably) the first empirical study to dem-
onstrate a statistically significant link be-
tween organizational structure and per-
formance.  His paper with Monteverde 
(1982) was the first to establish a statisti-
cally significant link between asset speci-
ficity and organizational structure, thereby 
helping to transform transaction cost eco-
nomics into an empirically relevant para-
digm. 1
 
In addition to his academic accomplish-
ments, Teece is also an intellectual entre-
preneur, an academic entrepreneur, and an 
institution builder.  Among his activities, 
his has built a very successful research In-
                                                 
1 Monteverde and Teece (1982) contribution was the 
first study which showed statistical support for the 
transaction cost framework.  The empirical support 
for transaction cost economic has since been grow-
ing.  Oliver Williamson often refers to these empiri-
cal studies as indications that transaction cost eco-
nomics is “an empirical success story” (Williamson, 
2002).  
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 stitute (IMIO) and a global publicly traded 
(NASDAQ listed) expert services company, 
LECG Corporation.  Today LECG has over 
650 employees and more than 20 offices 
worldwide.  In building LECG, Teece has 
drawn on his academic ideas and experi-
ence.  He has created a unique business 
model which (as with his writings) inte-
grates elements of evolutionary theory, or-
ganization theory, leadership, competence 
based theory and transaction cost issues.2 
He also co-founded a successful private 
equity firm of considerable size (i-cap) and 
effectuated the takeover and turnaround of 
a publicly traded sports apparel firm.  Ever 
since graduate school he has been a suc-
cessful and very active consultant on deci-
sions and disputes. His clients have been 
corporations and governments around the 
world.  
To be sure, Teece’s work in the real world 
has not compromised his academic activi-
ties; on the contrary, his unusual ability to 
work in both worlds brings insights from 
business to bear in his academic research.  
Another man might have handled the pos-
sible tension between working in business, 
and in academia, by compartmentalization; 
but Teece has managed to channel the ten-
sion into an unusual productive program of 
research.  In effect, Teece’s interest in ex-
tending his scholarly ideas to business ac-
tivities tied him to the mast, like Ulysses, 
and enabled him to actually enjoy the siren 
songs of academic disciplines (in particu-
larly economics) without losing the critical 
distance so vital for interdisciplinary and 
empirical inquiry.  Like Herbert Simon, 
James March and others who have been 
developing an ‘empirically relevant’ theory 
of the firm (see, for instance, Simon, 1997), 
Teece’s work advances our understanding 
of the modern business enterprise which 
(unlike traditional econonomics) can ac-
commodate ideas such as market disequi-
librium, firm behavior, and the interaction 
of firms in markets.3
 
How can we understand his ideas and con-
tributions in the face of such diversity, 
spanning across disciplines and traditional 
boundaries between theory and the empiri-
cal world of business? 
 
                                                 
                                                 
3 In keeping with the Ulysses metaphor and the 
comparison with Simon:  Considering Simon’s over 
1000 publications in (very) different disciplinary 
circles, Simon could appear to be always leaving 
and never finding home; always embracing a new 
discipline with passion and intensity, but at the same 
time always appearing to be moving away.  Simon 
never really joined an established disciplinary com-
munity, preferring instead to establish his own do-
mains (such as behavioral science, cognitive psy-
2 Elements of LECG’s highly differentiated business 
model are explicated in Teece (2003) and in A Stan-
ford Business School case titled LECG and the 
Leveraging of Intellectual Capital:  From Private to 
IPO to Acquisition to Private MBO.  Teece has 
pioneered and applied an entirely new model of 
business organization (see below). 
 
 7
 Teece has recently written about how his 
experience from building a world class ex-
pert services firm can contribute to further 
understanding of issues relating to eco-
nomic organization (see in particular, Teece 
2003).  The business model he designed 
and implemented (at LECG) challenges 
accepted notions in human resource man-
agement and compensation theory.  He has 
successfully designed and implemented an 
entirely new organizational and compen- 
Furthermore, Teece co-founded the UC 
Berkeley management of technology pro-
gram and has built and obtained funding for 
the Institute of Management, Innovation 
and Organization (an interdisciplinary re-
search center).  He is a co-founder and co-
editor of the journal, Industrial and Corpo-
rate Change.   
 
This is a remarkable portfolio of accom-
plishments, at least for a serious academic, 
and demonstrates the Ulyssian urge to 
strive, rather than sit still; the capacity for 
aspiration, and a determination for knowl-
edge and intellectual adventures, rather than 
peaceful dullness.  The exploratory way of 
the intellectual adventurer is manifested, for 
instance, in the search for the ideas and 
reflections on human rationality and deci-
sion making in different disciplines 
(Simon); in the attempts to develop ideas to 
understand organizational and individual 
intelligence in the face of numerous biases, 
imperfections and contradictions (March); 
and in the drawing upon knowledge and 
experiences in business activities in devel-
oping a coherent understanding of the dy-
namics of the business firm (Teece) – all 
aspirations that will contribute to the 
growth of consciousness and knowledge.  
Seen this way, research (be it in economics, 
organization theory, or strategic manage-
ment) is driven by a process by which the 
inner quest for looking beyond the present 
sation model for professional service firms.  
In doing so, he has perhaps pioneered key 
elements of the modern (talent oriented) 
corporation. 
                                                                        
chology, artificial intelligence).  Domains, which 
were close enough to mainstream disciplines to 
allow recognition, yet different enough to not ex-
pecting Simon to be its follower.  For, how can you 
follow, when your instinct is to lead?  Ulysses rest-
lessness (which we also see in the poem by Alfred 
Lord Tennyson, 1842) represents the restlessness of 
dedicated scholars as well as their fierce work ethic 
and interest in productivity.  In the poem, Ulysses, 
Tennyson reveals the horror of retirement, of ease 
and relaxation.  Ulysses (and similar spirits, such as 
Simon, March and Teece) wants to be productive, 
always rushing forward, just as in the poem "Ulys-
ses,"(where Ulysses says:  ”For ever and for ever 
when I move.  How dull it is to pause, to make an 
end, to rust unburnish'd, not to shine in use!”).  
Ulysses can't bear to stay at home and enjoy his 
leisure after a lifetime of adventure.  He lives for 
knowledge, and his search for intelligence and 
knowledge is unending (“To follow knowledge like 
a sinking star, Beyond the utmost bound of human 
thought.”).  For this reason, he sets off again on new 
voyages; just like scholars set off on intellectual 
journeys, traveling into new disciplines, or new 
areas (“To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield”).  
It is this instinct to be independent and to be differ-
ent, in addition to an enormous intellectual curiosity, 
which allowed Simon to be so broad in the scope of 
his research, and which allows Teece to be able to 
so successfully use his academic ideas in domains 
beyond traditional academic adventures.  
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 Intellectual Formation and Early Work state of knowledge fuels the outward jour-
ney and, in turn, the outward journey illu-
minates inward realization (this is consis-
tent with March’s theme of Don Quixote, 
see for instance March 1996).  The cycle is 
endless; because the possibilities of growth 
of knowledge are endless.4 The mind of 
dedicated scholars is always searching for 
knowledge of what always surrounds and 
extends well beyond our current reach.5 
Yet, as we continue to penetrate, we leave 
behind us the skins of our former ideas and 
theories, and embrace an increasingly 
greater potential.  As we choose to do so, 
we join in spirit with Ulysses, and push 
science forward.6  
Teece began studying economics in 1967 at 
Canterbury University in New Zealand, 
before going to graduate school in the US.  
He acquired very early an interest in under-
standing the organization of business firms; 
and was also interested in international 
economics.  From his father, who was a 
business man who had founded a trucking 
company, he gained insight into some ele-
mentary issues in management.  This plan-
ted the seeds for the ideas he has later de-
veloped in his contributions to business 
strategy and the theory of economic organi-
zation.  
 
 Studying economics at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Teece learned under very 
respected faculty such as Steven Ross, Al-
marin Philips and Edwin Mansfield.  He 
did his dissertation with Ed Mansfield on 
international technology transfer.  He was 
not a student of Oliver Williamson as many 
assume, but he was clearly influenced by 
Oliver Williamson’s pathbreaking work in 
transaction cost economics.  
As an introduction to the interview below, I 
will summarize some of Teece’s most sig-
nificant ideas and contributions, which will 
be discussed in the interview. 
                                                 
4 Tennyson's Ulysses invites us: 
 
“Come, my friends,  
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world.  
Push off, and sitting well in order smite  
The sounding furrows; for my purpose holds  
To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths  
Of all the western stars, until I die.”   
5 This also is the theme in March’s ‘A Scholar’s 
Quest’ where March talks about man seeking 
knowledge and desiring “for its own sake, the con-
formity of his own character to his standard of ex-
cellence, without hope of good or evil from other 
source than his own inward consciousness”. 
Multiproduct Organization 
While Teece was already as a student inter-
ested in the theory of the business enter-
prise, his interest in this subject was further 
stimulated when during his graduate years 
he read a manuscript version of Oliver Wil-
liamson’s first major work in transaction 
6 In more poetic words (Tennyson’s), this is when 
we become:  
“One equal temper of heroic hearts,  
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will  
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.”  
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 cost economics (Williamson, 1975).  Wil-
liamson followed Coase in viewing markets 
and hierarchies as alternative structures for 
organizing transaction, and introduced the 
idea of transaction costs as the major de-
terminant of the boundaries of the firm.  
This was a major inspiration; and Teece felt 
that this helped solve puzzles economics 
had been unable to explain such as the exis-
tence (and scope) of the firm (Teece, 1984).  
Since neoclassical economics was unable to 
deal with firms (other than as production 
functions), the transaction cost framework 
expanded the explanatory power of eco-
nomics by integrating ideas such as 
bounded rationality, incomplete informa-
tion, and small numbers bargaining.  It was 
natural for Teece to begin to apply transac-
tion cost ideas to the study of vertical inte-
gration in specific industries (Teece, 1976) 
and diversification (1980, 1982).   
 
In building a theory of the multiproduct 
firm, Teece used ideas from Edith Penrose 
(1959) to build an economic theory of the 
firm which could accommodate the multi-
product character of the modern firm 
(Teece, 1982).  Until his work, economic 
theory could not explain diversification 
well.  Until Teece’s work, market power 
and managerial explanations were in vogue.  
These could explain little.  Indeed, Panzar 
and Willig’s work (for instance, 1981) on 
economies of scope did not have strong 
organizational implications at all.  Thus, 
Teece argued that while those theories 
could explain aspects of joint production, 
they couldn’t explain why firms adopted 
multiproduct structures over outsourcing or 
joint venture arrangements.  In his paper 
“An Economic Theory of the Multiproduct 
Firm”, Teece introduced ideas from evolu-
tionary economics (particularly Nelson and 
Winter, 1982), and from Edith Penrose.7  
 
As recently argued (Rugman and Verberke, 
2002), Penrose’s legacy in strategic man-
agement is a curious one.  Much cited, but 
little read, her work is recognized as one of 
the main intellectual foundations for mod-
ern resource based theories of the firm and 
strategy.  However, Penrose wasn’t much 
interested in contributing to the field of 
strategy per se; and numerous misinterpre-
tations (or misreadings) of her work do not 
seem to acknowledge that her main contri-
bution was to understanding the nature of 
the firm and its growth (not strategy); and 
that firms can be viewed as a collection of 
resources.  Teece’s paper on the multipro-
duct firm was the first to apply Penrose’s 
ideas to strategic management issues, and 
                                                 
7 Edith Penrose is now widely recognized as a pre-
cursor for ideas in the competence based theory of 
the firm and strategic management (Rugman and 
Verberke, 2002); but in 1982, she wasn’t cited at all.  
In fact, Teece’s work brought her to relevance for 
modern theories and he was the first to use her in-
sights in developing the resource and competence 
based perspectives on the firm and strategy.    
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 he focused on her observation that human 
capital in firms is usually not entirely ‘spe-
cialized’ and can therefore be (re)deployed 
to allow the firm’s diversification into new 
products and services.  He also used Pen-
rose’s view that firms possess excess re-
sources which can be used for diversifica-
tion (1982).  Later, Wernerfelt (1984) cites 
Penrose for “the idea of looking at firms as 
a broader set of resources … [and] the op-
timal growth of the firm involves a balance 
between exploitation of existing resources 
and development of new ones”.  And this 
basic idea is now the foundation for much 
of the research by scholars working on the 
resource based theory of the firm (see for 
instance, Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).  
(see, e.g. Teece 1982, 1986, 1996).  Like 
Richard Cyert and James March, he uses 
ideas of “conflict” and firm heterogeneity 
(Teece, 2003; Teece et al, 2002).  In addi-
tion, he has recently carried insights from 
the behavioral theory of the firm into the 
tradition of strategic management (see in 
particular Teece et al, 2002; and Teece, 
Rumelt and Schendel, 1991). 
 
His paper, ‘Profiting from Technological 
Innovation’ (Teece, 1986) also integrated 
insights (such as the tactiness of knowledge 
and the nature of innovation) not tradition-
ally on the radar screen of economists.  The 
paper (which is the most cited paper ever 
published in ‘Research Policy’) developed 
a framework for understanding why (and 
under which conditions) innovating firms 
may fail to obtain significant economic 
returns from an innovation while custom-
ers, imitators and other industry players 
benefit, focusing in particular on the role of 
(the ownership of) complementary assets, 
regimes of appropriability, and the evolu-
tion (and paradigmatic character) of indus-
try development (in particular the role of 
dominant designs). 
 
When Teece first introduced this perspec-
tive in 1982, it was built directly on ideas 
from transaction cost economics, evolu-
tionary economics and from Edith Penrose; 
but at a deeper level, we may also see 
Teece as a ‘grandchild’ of the behavioral 
theory of the firm – tradition emerging out 
of Carnegie Tech in the 1950s and 1960s.8 
Like Herbert Simon, Teece builds on ideas 
on bounded rationality and is interested in 
developing a more realistic and empirically 
relevant theory of economic organization 
 
Strategic Management 
At a time where the field of strategic man-
agement was, at best, very scattered Teece 
began extending his ideas on the theory of 
the firm to business strategy.  He was 
                                                 
8 The direct intellectual link goes through Oliver 
Williamson, who was a graduate student at Carnegie 
in the early 1960s; and through Sid Winter and Dick 
Nelson who were closely connected to the Carnegie 
group in the late 50s and early 60s.  
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 among the first to argue that a theory of 
strategic management can build on insights 
from economics, while realizing that many 
shortcomings of the neoclassical program 
made it necessary to include alternative 
approaches (Teece, 1984; Teece and Win-
ter, 1984).  
 
That strategic management can build on 
theories of economic organization in gen-
eral and theories of the firm in particular is 
now well established. But this was not al-
ways so.  When Rumelt (1984) talked about 
“a strategic theory of the firm”, arguing that 
the study of business strategy must take off 
from economic theories of the firm, the 
dialogue between economic theories of the 
firm and strategic management was largely 
absent.  The tensions between neoclassical 
theory of the firm and strategic manage-
ment included the treatment of know-how, 
the emphasis on dynamics vs. statics, and 
the differences in behavioral assumptions 
(Teece, 1984; Winter and Teece, 1984).   
 
It wasn’t until the mid 1980s that strategy 
scholars began to realize the usefulness of 
recent developments in organizational eco-
nomics (in particular transaction cost theory 
and evolutionary economics) (Teece, 1984).  
Teece (1984) thus indicated how capability 
considerations may be further integrated 
with transaction cost arguments in order to 
enrich strategic management research, an 
approach that was started with Teece 
(1982).  Another argument that developed 
(and is now well established) was that inte-
grating economic theories with strategic 
management could address issues, theoreti-
cal as well as practical, with regard to ques-
tions of firm boundaries and organizational 
design (1988).  
 
In the paper “Dynamic Capabilities and 
Strategic Management” (Teece et al, 1997), 
Teece developed a framework of under-
standing the different intellectual traditions 
which can be classified as strategy research:  
The competitive forces theory espoused by 
Michael Porter (which focused on the struc-
ture of markets and the nature of competi-
tion in different industries); the game theo-
retical approach to strategic management 
(which argued that firms could gain com-
petitive advantage by a series of strategic 
moves); and the resource based perspective.  
In addition to those three major traditions, 
Teece suggested a perspective which fo-
cused on the kind of capabilities that firms 
must acquire to establish competitive ad-
vantage in industries with rapid technologi-
cal change (also see Teece and Pisano, 
1994).  This provided a conceptual frame-
work for mapping out the field of strategic 
management, which is now widely ac-
cepted.  It helped facilitate a dialogue be-
tween the different traditions, and organ-
ized the conceptual content in the field.  
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 This is important not only as an aid to our 
understanding of fundamental issues in the 
management of organizations but also in 
terms of it’s potential for future research in 
strategy.  
The idea of routines traveled from Cyert 
and March to the work of Nelson and Win-
ter and, from there, into strategic manage-
ment (Teece et al, 2002; Winter, 2000).  
Moreover, building on the idea of standard 
operating procedures, Teece has developed 
the idea of dividing a firm's competence 
into allocative, administrative and transac-
tional elements.  The dynamic capability 
view of strategy emphasizes that the “key 
role of strategic management in appropri-
ately adapting, integrating, and re-
configuring internal and external organiza-
tional skills, resources and functional com-
petencies toward a changing environment” 
(Teece and Pisano, 1994, p. 57), thereby 
building on behavioral ideas of adaptation 
and the dynamic character of expectations 
and goals.  It also follows the behavioral 
view in seeing learning as an organizational 
process; “[w]hile individual skills and 
knowledge can contribute critically to the 
organization, learning processes are intrin-
sically social and collective” (Teece et al, 
2002, p. 90).  Moreover, “[a] more specific 
application of [behavioral ideas] in the dy-
namic capabilities literature is the impor-
tance of routines in identifying and explor-
ing opportunities” (p. 91).  Through 
mechanisms such as uncertainty avoidance 
and problemestic search influencing the 
standard operating procedures of the firm, a 
firm’s organization and performance is 
uniquely influenced by the nature of deci-
 
Perhaps a more well known outcome of this 
paper was the introduction of the term ‘dy-
namic capabilities’, an idea which is cur-
rently enthusiastically employed by strate-
gic management scholars.  In fact, a quick 
look at the citations demonstrates that dy-
namic capability was popularized before 
the publication of the original paper; it had 
circulated for seven years as a working pa-
per in multiple drafts before it appeared in 
the Strategic Management Journal. 
 
The dynamic capability approach builds on 
both the resource based, transaction cost 
and evolutionary and behavioral theories of 
the firm, and seeks to explain how firms 
achieve and sustain competitive advantage 
in an ever changing environment.  High 
performance of internal processes (or, in 
Cyert and March’s terminology, ‘standard 
operating procedures’) are critical.  So is 
the ability to sense and seize market and 
technological opportunities.  Routines de-
fine the tasks of the organization; how the 
organization solves problems, and how tacit 
knowledge translates into learning.  
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 sion making; as is the firm’s strategic be-
havior.  As emphasized by Cyert and March 
(1963) and Simon (1955, 1993), firm deci-
sion making and strategy depends on the 
firm’s ability to identify decision opportu-
nities, create them and to act on them fac-
ing bounded rationality and uncertainty; (cf. 
Simon, 1993: “strategic decisions is a chap-
ter in the topic of decision making under 
uncertainty”).  In keeping with this perspec-
tive, the dynamic capability view empha-
sizes that dynamic capabilities of a firm 
depends on both its ability to identify stra-
tegic opportunities and its ability to change 
the structure of the firm to better exploit 
those opportunities (Teece et al, 2002, p. 
92; Teece, 2004). 
 
The future relevance of strategic manage-
ment will depend on whether future devel-
opments in the field will bring us closer to 
an empirically relevant paradigm, which 
can accommodate and address issues relat-
ing to the dynamics of the business enter-
prise. This in turn will depend on the ability 
of the scholars and ideas within strategic 
management to work together and for the 
research program to accommodate an inter-
disciplinary vision, and to be disciplined 
(March, 1996). As Teece points out in the 
interview below, such a (interdisciplinary, 
yet disciplined) vision is the first step to-
ward realizing a coherent program in stra-
tegic management; and we may see the 
dynamic capability program as taking the 
first important steps toward establishing a 
coherent and rigorous research program in 
strategic management. The dynamic capa-
bility program integrates ideas from 
Teece’s previous work, and sets a research 
agenda for future studies in strategic man-
agement.  
 
The following conversation took place 
March 25-May 28, 2003, at UCB between 
David J. Teece (DT) and Mie Augier (MA). 
 
MA: First a few background questions. 
How and why did you become interested in 
economics in the first place? 
 
DT: Well, I guess I was lucky in the sense 
that while economics wasn’t taught in sec-
ondary school in New Zealand, I had the 
good fortune of having a brother who was 
studying economics and he brought home a 
copy of Lee Bach’s introductory textbook 
(Bach, 1954).  I picked it up and started 
reading it and there were ideas that I found 
very interesting and so I told myself that 
this was the subject that I wanted to study.  
 
MA: Did you already then have an interest 
in the firm and in management? 
 
DT: Yes, my father was a manager and a 
director of, what I thought at the time was a 
sizable company.  He had started his own 
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 MA: Why did you choose to go overseas 
and study at Wharton? 
company when he was 18; a small trucking 
company and actually pioneered a thrice 
weekly freight service between the west 
coast of the Southern Island of New Zea-
land and the northern part of the Island.  He 
went overseas (to North Africa and then 
Italy) during the second World War as part 
of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.  
Before being deployed to fight alongside 
the British in North Africa, he became a 
founding shareholder in Transport (Nelson) 
Ltd. 
  
DT: I was very fortunate to grow up in 
New Zealand. As an undergraduate, I dis-
covered that I wasn’t a good athlete, but I 
did do well academically.  One has to focus 
on what one is good at.  I loved to learn.  It 
was an escape.  So it was natural for me to 
want to do graduate study.  I needed a step-
ping stone to embrace the larger world.  
Living in a small country was lovely but a 
bit limiting.  I was very much provoked by 
things external to my daily life.  
  
He never talked about management but I 
knew viscerally that he was a respected 
manager, known for his fairness, objectiv-
ity, operational skills, and bottom line fo-
cus.  My father never said  ‘oh you should 
study economics or management’.  But 
merely observing him got me interested in 
some of the issues.  Even in high school I 
was very much interested in public policy 
and the competitiveness of nations.  I was 
also interested in international trade.  
Growing up in a small country there is very 
much an interest in external economic 
forces.  New Zealand was and remains 
highly dependent on international trade.  
The two areas of specialization I chose in 
graduate school in the United States were 
international economics and industrial or-
ganization.  
 
A key question one might ask is, how did I 
ever get to a world class place?  It’s a long 
story.  As I was growing up in New Zea-
land, I was living, in a virtual sense, in the 
rest of the world.  I listened every night to 
short wave radio.  It was one way commu-
nication (listening) but I felt connected to 
the external world.  Today, kids are chat-
ting on the Internet with other kids from the 
rest of the world. So, even though we didn’t 
have chat rooms and all the technology of 
the Internet, we had radios and I had sev-
eral short waves radios and a hugh antenna.  
I tuned into the BBC, Voice of America, 
and Radio Beijing almost every night.  The 
Chinese were broadcasting lots of revolu-
tionary garbage.  Talking about the Ameri-
can “bandits” in Indochina.  Some of it was 
comical.  Voice of America was a bit 
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 MA: What can you tell about your early 
graduate years?  Your advisor was Mans-
field but you also worked with Oliver Wil-
liamson? 
dreary but had good coverage of the space 
program and foreign policy speeches of the 
Secretary of State. 
 
When I was considering graduate school, 
the comfortable thing to do would have 
been to stay in New Zealand, but I didn’t 
want that.  It was a challenge to go over-
sees; and to go to the United States was a 
special challenge.  Students in New Zea-
land wanting graduate study abroad in eco-
nomics would traditionally go to the Lon-
don School of Economics, or to Cambridge, 
or to Oxford.  That was also where most 
scholarships were set up.  But I got advice 
– which was good advice – that there were 
good possibilities in the US and that the 
future of the field of economics was in 
North America.  Canada actually had much 
greater visibility in New Zealand, and many 
would go to UBC.  Indeed, I had never 
heard of Wharton until 1970.  Wharton 
didn’t actually require a GRE for students 
coming from New Zealand.  That’s one 
reason I applied!  I’m sure it was possible 
to take a GRE in New Zealand but I had 
never heard of the exam at the time.  So I 
didn’t apply to the schools where the test 
was required - - - which was almost every-
where.  Somehow I got into Wharton.  And 
I got a fellowship.  I was really lucky.  I 
had no idea how good a place it was until 
much later. 
 
DT: I liked Penn from the beginning.  
Philadelphia took a little getting used to.  I 
found it easy studying micro theory and 
macro theory because, unlike many other 
students, I had already had four years of 
economics.  
 
At that time, the economics department at 
Wharton took in many students and only 
about half would make it through the first 
year.  The first year’s exams were designed 
to sort the wheat from the chaff.  Even 
though I wasn’t strong in mathematics, I 
got by.  And then I ran into Olly.  I never 
took a class from him; many people assume 
that I was a student of his, but I never was a 
direct student. I took IO with Almarin Phil-
ips, and I was interested in theories of mar-
ket failures and the appropriate role for 
government.  In fact, that was one of the 
reasons I liked Olly’s work. He built on the 
ideas of market failures, which I knew from 
the study of welfare economics.   
 
I also took Edwin Mansfield’s class on the 
economics of technological change and he 
encouraged me to study international tech-
nology transfer.  Because of my back-
ground in international trade and finance  
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 DT:  Yes.  It was that book that made me 
feel that here was a chance to build a half-
way decent theory of the firm.  I had been 
thinking about the international firm.  I was 
aware of Hymer’s work.  Olly’s manuscript 
provided a brilliant conceptual apparatus 
for organizing my thinking about firms.  It 
didn’t help much in terms of understanding 
innovation, but the framework was rich and 
deep.  Having had Mansfield the pure em-
piricist as my advisor I needed some con-
ceptual apparatus to understand business 
and the multinational firm. 
and economic development, I was inter-
ested.  But no one, not even Mansfield, 
knew anything at all about the topic. 
 
I ended up with Mansfield as my advisor.  
He had decided at that time that he didn’t 
like economics and had a strong distain for 
theory so it was actually hard doing a thesis 
with him.  But I did it.  It was an empirical 
study of the costs of technology transfer, 
and was completed before the modern lit-
erature on the nature of technology existed.  
I was writing on a blank slate.  This was 
hard to do as a student.  
 So, I was in my final year and I was waiting 
for Mansfield to read my thesis because he 
was always a little bit slow in getting to it – 
just as I might be a bit slow in getting back 
to my students.  I had nothing to do for a 
short period and I went by Oliver’s office 
and volunteered my time as a research as-
sistant and he gave me a manuscript version 
of Markets and Hierarchies.  He said ‘come 
back when you have read this’.  
Mansfield was a pragmatic and brilliant 
scholar.  However, I think his own work 
would have been more powerful if it has 
been linked to a broader framework, such 
as the theory of the firm or the evolution of 
technology.  But that was not how he 
worked.  I did however learn a lot from 
Mansfield.  He had a good nose for data.  
My thesis was published as a book with a 
couple of papers being spun off into jour-
nals - - - one paper in the  Economic Jour-
nal and the other in Management Science. 
 
This was in 1974, I think.  He gave me the 
manuscript, I read it and I immediately ap-
preciated and understood its importance, 
even though I had not taken a course from 
him.  I knew the foundations - - - market 
failures, Akerlof’s market for “lemons”, 
Simons’ bounded rationality.  I was famil-
iar with the bits and pieces and I thought 
Markets and Hierarchies was magnificent.  
 
MA: One of the books that seem to have 
influenced your early work is Markets and 
Hierarchies (Williamson, 1975).  Do you 
remember when you came across that in the 
first place? 
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 MA: Were there other scholars who in-
spired you at the time? 
I went back to Olly and said, “this is a great 
book.  This is the framework we need to 
understand firms.” He didn’t disagree.  It 
provided powerful new insights into what 
firms were all about.  I told him so and I 
feel good about that today.  I think I still 
know it when I read something that is a 
major contribution!    
 
DT: Yes, many.  Mansfield, Kuznets, 
Rosenberg, Kindleberger, Koopmans, Ak-
erlof, Arrow, Baumol, Leontief.  But by the 
time I had graduated, it was Olly who I 
admired the most.  By now my field was 
Industrial Organization.  Standard industrial 
organization – built around the structure 
conduct performance paradigm – was very 
sketchy with respect to what firms were all 
about.  I hadn’t read much of Chandler yet 
– I read Chandler subsequent to reading 
Markets and Hierarchies – so for me Mar-
kets and Hierarchies was a great entre into 
the theory of the firm.  I sort of knew at 
some level that this was critical to econom-
ics and business studies.  I still believe that 
one of the big shortcomings of economics 
is the theory of the firm, despite its recent 
progress.  Of course, there’s been consider-
able progress in the last 15 years on the 
theory of the firm.  But it has slowed, and 
there is a lot more distance to travel. 
 
I jumped on Olly’s bandwagon.  I was able 
to give him a little bit of assistance on the 
two chapters on innovation  … those two 
chapters sort of hang out on a limb and are 
not fully integrated into Markets and Hier-
archies.  Note that when you come to the 
Economic Institutions of Capitalism the 
topic of innovation disappears.  Oliver kind 
of solved the problem of intellectual coher-
ence by throwing out the innovation chap-
ters... that is why I often say to people that I 
think Markets and Hierarchies is the richer 
book.  The Economic Institutions of Capi-
talism [Williamson, 1985] is tidied up so 
that economists would find it more palat-
able.  And indeed, Grossman and Hart and 
many others have jumped onto the idea of 
specialized assets, and built upon Olly’s 
work.  However, what they have is not a 
theory of the firm to me.  Markets and Hi-
erarchies has this richness; it has a Carne-
gie flavor to it.  All the essential elements 
of the economic institutions of capitalism 
are there, and more.  I think that book was 
transformational. 
 
MA: You didn’t read any Simon or March 
when you were in graduate school? 
 
DT: Well, I sort of backed into it through 
Williamson’s books and references.  You 
know, you kind of got the flavor of it from 
reading Williamson.  So I didn’t read them 
very carefully in graduate school.  I did so 
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 subsequently.  The year that I was doing 
industrial organization Oliver was visiting 
in the UK.  The IO course was taught by Al 
Philips who was much more interested in 
classical antitrust than Olly was.  And I’m 
sure if I were to find Al’s original reading 
list from that course, there would be noth-
ing of March and Simon on it.  But I came 
to them from Williamson and I followed up 
and read more but never really had any in-
struction on it – I do remember buying ‘A 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm’ and ‘Or-
ganizations’ and reading them.  It could be 
when I just came to Stanford.  Lee Bach 
had been Dean at Carnegie and he wanted 
someone at the business school at Stanford 
who was interested in opening up the 
“black box” of the firm.  He knew I had 
been influenced by Mansfield and William-
son.  I’m sure my interest in the firm and 
the esteem with which he held my mentors 
was one reason I got hired.  
 
MA: I’d like to know how and why you 
came across Penrose’s work.  You’re the 
first one to use her in theories of the 
firm/strategy so I was wondering how you 
picked her up? 
 
DT: Yes, no one had read her.  If I remem-
ber it right, it might have been Sidney Win-
ter who told me I should read Penrose.  It 
must have been around 1978 or something 
like that.  I think it was after Sid read my 
paper on ‘The Economics of Scope and the 
Scope of the Enterprise’ (Teece, 1980).  
And no one knew anything about Edith 
Penrose or her work.  It was difficult to find 
the book.  She had zero visibility in eco-
nomics or management.  It is hardly a claim 
to fame but I am quite sure that you find no 
references in the research by faculty at 
business schools to Edith Penrose until the 
publication of my paper ‘Towards an Eco-
nomic theory of the Multiproduct firm’ 
[Teece, 1982].  Birger Wernerfelt then 
picked up on it I think and he was perhaps 
the first one in strategy to use her ideas 
[Wernerfelt, 1984].  I didn’t consider my-
self to be in strategy back then.  I was just 
in industrial organization and business eco-
nomics.  
 
The other person I was talking to in those 
days was Dick Caves at Harvard who was 
working with Michael Porter.  I was slow to 
figure out early on why there was all this 
excitement around Porter’s work.  I didn’t 
know enough about strategic management 
at the time.  The contribution was not to 
economics; the contribution was making 
ideas from industrial organization really 
useful to managers.  Porter was excellent at 
translating ideas from old school industrial 
organization and marketing and converting 
them into a form so they were useful in a 
management context.  He provided a won-
derful framework for doing industry analy-
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 sis.  However, I believe that stuff is a bit 
overblown in terms of its importance to the 
history of ideas.  It’s unquestionably very 
utilitarian. 
 
MA: We’ll get back to strategy later.  I 
want to go back to your dissertation.  How 
did you find a topic? 
 
DT: Well, you see I had two majors; you 
were required to major in two fields back 
then – so I had industrial organization and 
international economics.  In fact, when I 
applied to Penn – they had this regional 
economics program, so I was going to do 
regional economics [laughs].  Remember as 
an undergraduate I had also studied geogra-
phy.  But I always had a good grounding in 
international economics and Mansfield 
picked that up and he was going to some 
conferences I think in Europe where tech-
nology transfer issues had surfaced in the 
defense-contracting context.  He wanted to 
get someone working on technology trans-
fer.  Ed always had a good nose for what 
was important.   
 
One of my term papers was on the theory of 
direct foreign investment.  Technology 
transfer was implicated so that’s how I indi-
rectly got into the theory of the firm, com-
ing in through trying to explain direct for-
eign investment and technology transfer.  
Stephen Hymers work was a break from 
tradition.  He helped bring industrial or-
ganization and international economics 
together in a theory of direct foreign in-
vestment and multinational enterprise.  That 
was revolutionary.  However, Hymer got all 
muddled up in ideas of monopoly “exploi-
tation” and confused the theory of direct 
foreign investment as much as he illumi-
nated it. 
 
Anyway, there’s now a whole literature in 
international business and the theory of the 
multinational firm.  That’s one place where 
the study of technology transfer belongs. 
Back then, my thesis didn’t really make the 
link between technology transfer and the 
theory of the firm because I was too ‘Mans-
fieldian’; I missed an opportunity.  I’m still 
working on it.  And indeed, when you look 
at ‘Economics of Scope and the Scope of 
the Enterprise’ (Teece, 1980) and ‘Towards 
an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct 
Firm’ (Teece, 1982), they are early efforts 
to bring technology and know how into the 
theory of the firm.  
 
If Markets and Hierachies had been written 
a couple of years earlier… if that had been 
published before I did my thesis on tech-
nology transfer, I think my thesis would 
have been much more interesting.  But it 
went the other way.  I’ve subsequently tried 
to bring technology and know how into 
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 transaction cost economics and the theory 
of the firm.  
It wasn’t very clear where to go next with 
my research because I didn’t have a con-
ceptual framework.  I had results but no 
theory to motivate them.  And it left me at a 
dead-end.  Actually, I did do another paper 
coauthored with Mansfield; he wanted to 
look at R&D activities in the multinational 
firm so that was another empirical paper. 
But I needed to backfill. 
 
But anyway, I picked up on Penrose and 
worked her in as well, and she suddenly 
became popular.  Few people in strategy 
actually read her; they seem to just guess 
what she said. Unfortunately, you have 
many derivative scholars in the field of 
strategy who never go back and understand 
the original stuff.  This is a major weakness 
in training in the field.  There are too many 
wannabe scholars not quite up to it.  They 
need to read the literature more carefully 
and build deep disciplinary roots. 
 
Where Williamson’s ideas came in is that 
they provided me with a conceptual frame-
work. With the lens of transaction cost eco-
nomics, I dove into Carnegie School ideas 
with encouragement from Sid Winter and 
Dick Nelson and I found a way to bring the 
technology story into the theory of the firm.  
There wasn’t in fact any literature with 
know how at the core of the theory of the 
firm.  Neither Cyert nor March or Wiliam-
son were oriented that way.  Nelson and 
Winter weren’t really working on a theory 
of the firm.  There was an opportunity to 
put technology and know how into the the-
ory of the firm.  That’s what I tried to do.  
In fact, most economists still leave it out.  If 
you read Groseman and Hart there is no 
references to technology, other than as a 
special case of hold-up.  
 
MA: When you were done with your thesis, 
what did you think you would study next? 
 
DT:  By the time I got my thesis done I had 
this interest and knowledge in technology 
transfer but I did not know a single soul, 
not a single person, in the economics pro-
fession who was interested in technology 
transfer.  I did subsequently meet Nathan 
Rosenberg - - - the only other one. I didn’t 
know Dick Nelson and Sid Winter at the 
time. However, I shouldn’t complain be-
cause I did get my thesis published as a 
book and the key article published in the 
Economic Journal so there was a constitu-
ency interested, but it was outside main-
stream economics.   
 
So, Williamson doesn’t have innovation 
and knowledge issues at the core .. nor for 
that matter do March and Simon.  Maybe 
I’m wrong; and maybe technology is a spe- 
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 cial case and maybe technology and organi-
zation do not belong at the core of the the-
ory of the firm.  My intuition tells me oth-
erwise.  Without having technology and 
know how at the core, I sometime wonder 
whether one really has a theory of the firm.  
One has a theory of the boundaries of the 
firm.  But, I’m not sure one has a theory of 
the firm.  Oliver certainly has a theory of 
vertical integration; but a theory of vertical 
integration is not a theory of the firm. A 
robust theory of the firm must be able to 
explain business competence, behavior be-
havior, and business strategy too. 
 
MA: Nelson and Winter – what did they 
add to your Penrose-Williamsonian frame? 
 
DT: How did I get to it …. Well, Sid came 
and gave a workshop at Penn when I was 
visiting there.  Brilliant guy.  I got to talk to 
him and he started moving me towards evo-
lutionary ideas.  He and Dick latched onto 
me as a potential fellow traveler.  Dick and 
Sid helped give a new direction and energy 
to some of the things I was playing with.  I 
gave them the manuscript version of  ‘The 
Economics of Scope and the Scope of the 
Enterprise’ (Teece, 1980).  The core idea is 
about finding failures in the market for 
know how and using that to explain diversi-
fication.  When they got that they said ‘gee, 
this is interesting’.  I had innovation in 
there but it was very Williamsonian.  They 
encouraged me to extend the paper, which I 
did.  I did get some very useful ideas from 
them. 
 
 ‘Toward an Economic Theory of the Mul-
tiproduct Firm’, is much richer as a result 
of their comments.  It brings in Penrose, 
and it is also much more in the Carnegie 
spirit.  I introduced organizational slack 
into the diversification story.  I see it as sort 
of a dynamic version of ‘Economics of 
Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise’.    
 
MA:  You went to Stanford; why didn’t you 
go to MIT?  One thinks of MIT when you 
think technology. 
 
DT: I almost did.  That was very interesting 
actually because my two key offers were 
Stanford and MIT.  MIT was joint – half in 
economics department and half in the Busi-
ness school.  At Stanford it was in the 
Business school with a courtesy appoint-
ment in economics.  And when I asked my 
advisors, they would all say I should go to 
MIT. Because if you asked any economist 
back then, and possibly even now, MIT is 
the stronger economics department.  It was 
certainly the number one economics de-
partment in the country at the time.  So, 
everyone at Penn said ‘you must go to 
MIT’.  And in fact, I accepted the job at 
MIT and called up Stanford and said I was 
going to MIT.  I got hold of Lee Bach.  He 
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 said ‘would you mind telling me the rea-
sons’ so I did.  He said ‘would you mind 
me telling you why those reasons are 
wrong’ and I said “no”.  So he told me why 
they were wrong reasons, and he was right, 
so I said ‘ok, I’m coming to Stanford’ so I 
called up MIT – this was all within an hour 
– and said I had changed my mind.  That 
was it. 
 
MA: Did you ever regret? 
 
DT: No, it was the right decision for me.  
Really, I think the reason I wanted to go to 
Stanford was because it was a 100% busi-
ness school appointment; MIT was sort of a 
business school appointment but they 
thought it would be a more attractive deal 
to me given where my head was at the time 
if they threw in a half appointment in eco-
nomics. The chances that I would have ever 
gotten tenure at MIT economics were low, I 
believe. In hindsight, I think they were just 
using the economics offer to induce me to 
come to MIT.  I would have had great col-
leagues in Joskow and McAvoy.  But I 
really wanted to study business, not just 
public policy, or regulation. 
 
Also, at Stanford, I was free to do my own 
stuff and at least initially I wasn’t thinking 
about other people’s research agendas or 
what other people wanted me to do.  There 
was really no one there with my interests 
and I didn’t mind at first.  I’ve always been 
a self starter.  At that point the school was 
trying to figure out what to do with busi-
ness economics so some people would say 
that was not a good place to start a career 
because there weren’t any strong senior 
faculty.  At MIT there was strong senior 
faculty but no one was critically interested 
in technology and the firm.  Now, it is con-
ceivable that I could have latched onto Paul 
Joskow –but Paul would probably have 
enticed me to go deeper in regulatory eco-
nomics.  So, I think the Stanford thing gave 
me the chance to have the plusses and mi-
nuses of not having any senior faculty.  
And I had good colleagues in the profession 
– Olly, Sid, Dick, and Joe Stiglitz and Nate 
Rosenberg. I related to them much more 
because there was no one at the Stanford 
Business School with my interests.  Lee 
Bach was always most encouraging and 
understood the importance of building a 
faculty interested in getting inside the 
“black box” of the firm.  But his interests 
were fundamentally in macro economics. 
 
MA: What did you teach at Stanford? 
 
DT:  I taught an MBA class on economics 
which was very interesting because Stan-
ford had been using a principles of econom-
ics-book in the MBA core.  I used Mans-
field’s applied micro book instead.  I 
thought I was going to teach all these smart 
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 MBA’s all about business and firms with an 
intermediate micro theory book.  Now, I 
was 26 or 27; the students were on average 
30, they had business experience and they 
asked me all those great questions about 
firms.  And there were no answers to those 
questions in the microeconomics text book.  
They were all good, legitimate questions 
and so I quickly became disillusioned with 
intermediate micro theory primarily from 
finding its inadequacies around the firm.  I 
then offered an elective course called ‘the 
economics of the enterprise’.  In fact I have 
a book proposal with that title accepted by 
Harvard University Press. It’s 20 years old 
now!  I never really got it done.  It is a book 
I should still write and I’ll send it to Har-
vard.  They gave me a $3000 advance for it 
[laughs].  It is still a good title, and it is a 
book worth writing.  You know, ‘managing 
intellectual capital’ is not that book; so I 
should come back to do that over the next 
ten years.  If I don’t, I’ll send them back the 
$3,000.  
 
MA: Why didn’t you stay at Stanford? 
 
DT: I think the issue was crystallized when 
I tried to get Olly Williamson to Stanford.  
I tried very, very hard and succeeded in 
persuading the GSB to make an offer to 
Olly.  And here’s what was going on: the 
business economics group in the business 
school was rudderless.  There were no sen-
ior faculty.  There was decision sciences 
group, a business and the environment 
group, but no strategy group.  Lee Bach 
was there.  He was a macro person. He had 
been the Dean at Carnegie during the great 
years and really wanted to build compe-
tence around organizational economics.  So 
they started a search process and there were 
very, very different views in the school 
about what economics in a business school 
should be.  
 
I had one very clear view which was it 
should be around Williamson and Nelson 
and Winter; and Bach was supportive of 
that but the guys in finance and the guys in 
decision theory were not enthusiastic about 
that at all and they really wanted the group 
to be more of an applied game theory 
group.  I nevertheless managed to persuade 
people that Oliver was sufficiently good 
that we should make him an offer and they 
did.  It wasn’t a particular good offer, but it 
was an offer.  And Olly was seriously con-
sidering it.  He came back and tried to bar-
gain for some extra things and they said no 
and so Olly didn’t come.  So, a chance to 
really shape Stanford by having Olly accept 
disappeared.  What happened is that the 
finance and the decision sciences guys said 
‘well, Bach and Teece, you clearly can’t 
build a group – so let us do it’.  So they 
built a great group of applied game theo-
rists and really missed an opportunity to 
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 create strength around the firm, around 
technology, and around strategy.  They still 
struggle with the ramifications of those 
decisions today.    
 
For a while, I was a high-flyer at Stanford.  
David Kreps and me were the first two to 
get accelerated promotions to associate 
professors without tenure.  I was there for 
only two years I think before getting this 
accelerated promotion.  I was on fast track!  
Then I started to see, ok, this group is going 
in a quite different direction.  My chances 
of getting tenure were going down not up.  
So I asked for an early tenure review, given 
that I had been advanced to associate so 
early.  I figured that if I was going to stay 
there I needed tenure because they were 
recruiting faculty who were not sympa-
thetic to my research agenda.  I was also 
very cocky because I had offers from 
Wharton; I had soft offers from all over the 
place.  It wasn’t worth fighting against a 
constituency that wasn’t interested in or-
ganizational economics and technology.  
Meanwhile, Berkeley came up with an of-
fer.  And then a most wonderful thing hap-
pened to me.  I applied for an associate pro-
fessor with tenure position.  The offer came 
and I accepted.  But within 30 days of my 
arrival at Berkeley I opened the mail, and 
there was a letter from the Chancellor, say-
ing that I was being immediately promoted 
to full professor!  The university review 
committee decided (without me or my 
school asking) that I ought to be a full pro-
fessor.  A complete bluebird.  Everyone 
deserves one of those somewhere in their 
career.  
 
MA: That’s wonderful. After how long? 
 
DT: Effective from the date that I arrived. 
 
And when I went to Berkeley I immediately 
started working on getting Olly Williamson 
hired which I did achieve, with the help of 
others of course. We have a great group 
now in organizational economics. The 
community includes Pablo Spiller, George 
Akerlof, Richard Gilbert, David Mowery, 
Howard Shelanski, Bob Merges and many 
others.  
 
MA: You wrote up Oliver’s case when he 
got hired? 
 
DA: Yes I said in there that he was going to 
get the Nobel Prize, long before it was 
common talk. … he should get it. He will 
get it. 
 
So, I was very happy to get an accelerated 
promotion.  I was advanced ahead of my 
own expectations.  It made me an extremely 
loyal citizen of the University of California.  
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 MA: Your 86 paper is the most cited paper 
in Research Policy.  Can you tell a bit 
about the pre-history of that paper? 
 
DT: I don’t remember how I came up with 
the idea but I do remember presenting it at 
a Stanford OB conference at the Asilomar 
conference center.  I was at Berkeley at the 
time.  I presented an early version of the 
paper (this must have been the early 80s) 
and it made no impression on the audience 
whatsoever.  I think it was the wrong audi-
ence.  I continued to work on the paper and 
then I presented it in Venice at a conference 
Giovanni [Dosi] organized.  The audience 
there was a technology policy audience.  
After I gave the paper Dick Nelson stood 
up, looked around, and said ‘we’ve just 
heard a very important paper’.  That sur-
prised me;  but it made me happy!  Keith 
Pavitt was there too and asked me to submit 
it to Research Policy, which I subsequently 
did.  Dick said that it was a conceptually 
important paper.  I had long been aware of 
the British success at invention coupled 
with failure at achieving subsequent com-
mercial success.  Historically this was al-
ways explained by reference to macro fac-
tors like access to capital and public policy.  
In the later 80s the same thing started to 
happen in the US.  You know, the US firms 
were very good with the early stages of 
innovation but the Japanese were winning 
in the global market place.  That was the 
story.  No one could explain it well.  There 
were all kinds of stories around macro eco-
nomic issues and the costs of capital; but I 
wasn’t satisfied with these explanations so I 
sought to find another framework.  To me, 
the question of understanding innovation 
really required a much more sophisticated 
firm level theory, and that’s why I devel-
oped the framework.  At that time, every-
one was interested in “competitiveness”.  
But there was a lot of hot air and few 
frameworks to help organize peoples’ 
thinking.   
 
There were (at least) four sets of ideas in 
my head that formed the basis of my paper. 
One set of ideas around the innovation cy-
cle which came from Abernatny and Utter-
back and so forth.  A whole other story 
about tacit knowledge, intellectual property, 
and immitability, and how it impacts strat-
egy.  Third, a set of ideas around transac-
tion costs.  And then I also was thinking 
about complementary assets which until 
that point weren’t recognized; no one was 
thinking about them.  And I thought about 
the nature of knowledge too.  The paper 
really integrates many of my early ideas.  
 
After Venice I became smarter in figuring 
out the natural audience for the paper.  I 
started to realize that the paper had legs.  I 
remember one entrepreneurship conference 
where I presented it to 2000 venture capi-
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 tal/entrepreneur types.  Afterwards I got 
mobbed.  About 100 people left me with 
cards because they wanted copies.  I almost 
felt like a rock star for the first (and last!) 
time.  It was great.  Anyway, I’m glad to 
see the ideas being used widely today.  I 
think I could do a slightly improved version 
today.  There’s still not really a competing 
paper out there.  It’s coming up on its 20th 
anniversary.  It still generates tons of cites.  
 
MA: When did you begin IMIO? 
 
DT: Well, I got to Berkeley in 1982.  In 
1983 there was this research unit – center 
for research on management – and they 
were looking for a new director.  The direc-
tor for many years had been a fellow by the 
name of West Churchman.  Churchman 
was the father of the field of systems think-
ing.  He and Fred Balderstom before him 
had created and built a great research center 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  It had been one of 
the first centers for the application of com-
puting to business.  They had big NSF 
grants supporting their research.  But by the 
mid 70’s it was completely run down.  
There was no activity or money left in it.  
So the University gave me this research 
center shell and asked me to rebuild it.  I 
started new initiatives around innovation 
and organization theory.  At one point I had 
several big grants from the Sloan founda-
tion.  Before I started LECG I put an enor-
mous amount of energy into the institute.  
We created and funded a lot of programs.  
We supported research by students and fac-
ulty all over campus and at other campuses 
too.  I was essentially using the study of 
competitiveness as a way to get funding to 
work on innovation and organizational 
change and things like that.  I wrote this 
very long research proposal.  I sent it to The 
Sloan Foundation and got several grants.  
We shared some of the money with Stan-
ford (Nate Rosenberg) and Columbia (Dick 
Nelson) and Harvard (Dick Rosenbloom).   
 
It was a very productive and important pe-
riod for research in business schools.  In 
fact, I think we helped trigger changes in 
business education.  I’m quite sure of it.  
Many business schools had become too 
theoretical.  You couldn’t tell the difference 
between a business school professor and an 
economics department professor.  These 
grants encouraged empirical work and 
really changed the focus and got business 
school academics to understand the com-
puter industry, the steel industry, and so on.  
Much research followed the specific indus-
try studies.  The consortium on competi-
tiveness and cooperation was the lead pro-
gram.  I got it started and David Mowery 
took it over.  We raised 2 or 3 million dol-
lars.  David did a great job.  Over the years 
I began putting more and more of my ef-
forts into LECG. Putting efforts into uni-
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 versity work can sometimes be a thankless 
task. Jim March captures the dilemmas well 
in ‘A Scholars Quest’ [March, 1996] with 
his statement that ‘research is not an in-
vestment, it is a testament’. However, I’ve 
continued to raise money for IMIO.  We 
now have $10M in endowment and are in 
line for some other significant gifts.  
 
MA: You have also worked in the real 
world.  What do you see as the main differ-
ences between business men and academ-
ics, and can the two worlds learn from each 
other?  
 
DT: When we as academics think about an 
issue, we know the literature so when we 
hear a problem; we have many ideas on 
how to approach the problem.  The problem 
with managers is that they don’t read and 
they therefore have the benefit of leverag-
ing business history.  They typically don’t 
even leverage their own corporate history 
very well.  The challenge we face is to take 
some of the ideas from deep thinkers like 
Jim March, Ken Arrow, Sid Winter and 
William Baumol, and Herbert Simon, and 
package them so that managers can under-
stand them better.  
 
Managers tend to be generalists. The 
American ones don’t read more than a cou-
ple of pages. European ones do read a bit 
more I think.  One reason I like lawyers as 
professionals is that they read .. there’s a lot 
of talent in that profession.  It’s sometimes 
easier for an academic to have a conversa-
tion with a great lawyer than a great man-
ager. 
 
I feel most at home in academia.  In part 
because I’m not really a business man.  
When I go into the business world I don’t 
go in because I’m executive chairman of 
LECG.  My calling card is more often than 
not my academic work.  I’m not a good 
glad hander.  I like intellectual executives 
like Marion and Herb Sandler at World 
Savings.  I admire creative ones like Steve 
Jobs.  I recently had lunch with George 
Soros - - - a brilliant investor who reads and 
writes.  
 
MA: How did you get interested in strate-
gic management?  
 
DT: I think I got a call from Cynthia Mont-
gomery welcoming me to the field!  She 
had read my paper on the multiproduct 
firm.  Until then I didn’t think of my field 
as including management.  I have a lot to 
thank her for.  Then I got invited to a stra-
tegic management society conference in the 
mid 80’s.   
 
The first real strategy paper I wrote was on 
dynamic capabilities.  I had written the ini-
tial paper and presented it at a number of 
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 workshops and it had really taken off.  And 
the working paper was frequently cited long 
before it was published.  At first I thought 
that since the working paper was out there 
and cited it didn’t need to be published.  
Gary Pisano who is a co-author once told 
me that the paper is the most frequently 
cited working paper in the field of strategy.  
Eventually, seven years later, the journal 
[Strategic Management Journal] requested 
it because they wanted to publish it.  Then I 
trimmed it down; and now everyone cites it 
as 1997.  So when you see the literature, 
people have stopped citing the working 
paper from the early 1990’s because now 
the published paper is there.  But that whole 
dynamic capabilities business, there’s no 
doubt that Gary and my work started that.  
No doubt.  Amy [Shuen] chipped in too. 
 
At some point I want you to talk to Gary 
Pisano because he was more aware of the 
fortunes of that paper; my career didn’t 
depend on the paper so I let the working 
paper languish and didn’t put effort into 
publishing it.  I once assumed a much more 
perfect market for academic ideas.  I used 
to think ‘the smart people will know where 
these ideas come from, it doesn’t matter if 
the paper is published or not”.  But in the 
field of strategy, there are very few careful 
scholars.  Many seem in a big hurry.  Au-
thors sometimes cite without going back to 
the source and actually reading the original.  
Unfortunately some strategy scholars don’t 
seem to exercise the same care and scholar-
ship as you see in the social sciences.  
 
MA: Another part of your work deals with 
knowledge management.  How did that be-
gin? 
 
DT: That is an interesting history.  Jiro 
Nonaka came to Haas as a visitor and at-
tended my class in the management of 
technology. It was great having him there. 
He always had a unique perspective. He 
took on the literature, mixed in his own 
experiences and philosophy, and produced 
the knowledge-creating firm book (with 
Takeuchi) which has been very influential 
with senior executives.  
 
MA: Did you get the idea of tacit knowl-
edge from Nelson and Winter; from Hayek 
or from Polyani? 
 
DT: Polyani.  My paper in the annals of 
academy of political and social sciences 
[Teece, 1981] is the first time I talk about 
that.  That’s before Nelson and Winter 
1982.  So you asked me, how did I get into 
knowledge management?  My doctoral dis-
sertation was on technology transfer and of 
course that is a core concept in knowledge 
management. 
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 MA: What do you see as your three most 
important papers?  
MA: What do you see as the future of the 
idea of dynamic capability?  Do you plan to 
work more in this area?  
DT: Hmm .. The 1982 paper, the 1986 pa-
per.  Well, maybe also the 1978 Bell Jour-
nal paper (with Armour).  That was the first 
time anyone showed a statistically signifi-
cant  relationship between organizational 
structure and economic performance.  Then 
the paper with Monteverde (1982).  Until 
those results came through transaction cost 
economics was having a hard time.  There 
was no compelling evidence.  This paper 
started the empirical tradition in transaction 
cost economics.  Others followed.  I’m not 
sure about the 1997 dynamic capabilities 
paper.  It is getting a lot of citations9.  The 
other papers are reasonable elegant in the 
sense that I wouldn’t change them now.  
But with respect to the 1997 paper, I’d like 
to rewrite it or say things a little different-
ly10.  The core ideas would stay the same.  
But those other paper I wouldn’t want to 
rewrite them.  I’m quite happy with how 
they are and always will be whereas the 
1997 paper I think about how I might say it 
differently. 
 
DT: Well, there isn’t really a future unless 
some more rigorous work is done in the 
area; but I hope there will be.  Really, dy-
namic capability was intended in the begin-
ning as just a set of ideas around flexibility, 
adaptability, integration, disintegration, 
complementary assets etc.  And until we 
start laying out some testable propositions, 
get some organizational performance data 
together, and so on, it won’t become a real 
paradigm.  It is still ‘pre-paradigmatic’, to 
use Thomas Kuhn’s terminology.  Fortu-
nately, there are quite a few people who are 
using the framework.  I think there will be 
time for me to contribute again.  I do plan 
to work more on it some day soon [see 
Teece, 2004].  I believe there are funda-
mental issues in strategic management 
which the paper can help illuminate. 
 
MA: Thanks very much for your time. 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                  
9 This paper received (in 2003) the Strategic Man-
agement Journal’s Best Paper Award.  
 
 10 Teece’s Viipuri lecture titled “Explicating Dy-
namic Capabilities” (2004) is the author’s effort to 
extend the paper.  
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